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Abstract
The widespread use of sensitive and constrained applications necessitates lightweight (low-
power and low-area) algorithms developed for constrained nano-devices. However, nearly all
of such algorithms are optimized for platform-based performance and may not be useful for
diverse and flexible applications. The National Security Agency (NSA) has proposed two
relatively-recent families of lightweight ciphers, i.e., Simon and Speck, designed as efficient
ciphers on both hardware and software platforms. This paper proposes concurrent error de-
tection schemes to provide reliable architectures for these two families of lightweight block
ciphers. The research work on analyzing the reliability of these algorithms and providing fault
diagnosis approaches has not been undertaken to date to the best of our knowledge. The main
aim of the proposed reliable architectures is to provide high error coverage while maintaining
acceptable area and power consumption overheads. To achieve this, we propose a variant of re-
computing with encoded operands. These low-complexity schemes are suited for lowresource
applications such as sensitive, constrained implantable and wearable medical devices. We
perform fault simulations for the proposed architectures by developing a fault model frame-
work. The architectures are simulated and analyzed on recent field-programmable grate array
(FPGA) platforms, and it is shown that the proposed schemes provide high error coverage. The
proposed low-complexity concurrent error detection schemes are a step forward towards more
reliable architectures for Simon and Speck algorithms in lightweight, secure applications.
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The need for lightweight cryptography has been emerged due to the advancement of con-
strained devices, such as radiofrequency identification (RFID) tags, nano-sensor networks,
and applications such as implantable and wearable medical devices. These utilize sensitive,
low-power implementations over very small chip area and consume low amount of energy.
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), the current symmetric-key cryptography standard,
may not achieve the necessary constraints for area, power consumption, and energy, necessi-
tating use of lightweight block ciphers. There have been prominent efforts to make the AES
more compact, e.g., a 128- bit AES was developed that expanded over an area of 2,400 gate
equivalent [1]. This has been a considerable reduction in area considering the AES algorithm.
However, it is still a large overhead burden for highly-constrained environments. Moreover,
the AES cannot adapt to the varying level of security needed by different devices. Not all
devices can spare area for 128-bit security. Consequently, it might waste chip area to encrypt
128-bit vectors where less bits need to be protected.
The above motivation calls for lightweight security and thus many lightweight block ci-
phers have been proposed to address these problems. However, some of these ciphers have
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been optimized for high performance on either hardware or software platforms. The ciphers
KATAN and KTANTAN [2], and PICCOLO [3] are all lightweight but are optimized to per-
form best on hardware platforms and might struggle to give good performance on software-
based constrained devices. Similarly, for algorithms such as SEA [4] and LED [5] ciphers,
having small code size and memory make them more inclined towards software-based de-
vices, having a constrained instruction set.
Currently, ISO 29192-2 standard specifies two lightweight block ciphers: CLEFIA, 128-
bit block cipher, and PRESENT, 64-bit block cipher. CLEFIA could provide high security
along with good hardware and software implementation capabilities. It had a proven highest
hardware gate efficiency of 401 on 90nm technology [3]. Moreover, it could perform on
a wide range of processors at high speeds. Similarly, PRESENT [6] has a compact design
smaller than the AES. It was optimized for hardware implementations by using a single 4-bit
S-box and had low power consumption and high chip efficiency.
The National Security Agency (NSA) has proposed two new lightweight block ciphers -
Simon and Speck [7], as alternatives to the above-mentioned encryption systems being used
for RFID tag readers. These ciphers have been submitted to ISO for inclusion in ISO 29192-2
standard. They work better on small hardware devices which have memory and processor
constraints. In [8], application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) implementation of Simon
and Speck was performed on 90nm technology and had efficiencies of 2,130 and 1,307, re-
spectively. They use simple nonlinear functions like AND and modular additions which can
be easily implemented on both hardware and software platforms, unlike PRESENT which has
been optimized only for hardware implementations. Moreover, Simon and Speck are fam-
ilies of ciphers, and each family has different ciphers based on the sizes of the blocks and
encryption keys. This makes them flexible to be used with a wide variety of devices. This
is our motivation for choosing Simon and Speck families of block ciphers above the other
lightweight block ciphers.
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In [9] and [10], these ciphers have been analyzed by attacking some of the rounds, and it
is concluded that the ciphers provide acceptable security. Differential fault analysis (DFA) of
these ciphers has been carried out in [11]. The work has exploited the data leaking due to the
AND operation in Simon to get the last round key. Similarly, in Speck, the modular addition
has been proved to be the weak link giving out information to obtain the key. A proper fault
detection technique needs to be in place to detect such cases and then respond to it by shutting
down the device or deleting the secret key.
Concurrent error detection (CED) techniques have been widely used to architect reliable
hardware for the AES and other cryptographic algorithms [12–19]. It is well-known that con-
current error detection techniques include a number of schemes, i.e., hardware, information,
time, hybrid redundancy. Hardware redundancy makes use of extra hardware to process the
same input twice to match the two outputs; any mismatch will trigger the error flag. Informa-
tion redundancy schemes have a number of variants, e.g., parity codes [20] and robust codes
[21]. Time redundancy technique has a number of schemes, i.e., recomputing with shifted
operands (RESO) [22], [23], recomputing with rotated operands (RERO) [24], and recomput-
ing with permuted operands (REPO) [25]. The hybrid redundancy scheme is given in [26–28]
where different improvements in the architecture have been proposed. The choice of the CED
technique is completely dependent on the requirements in terms of overhead tolerance, secu-
rity, and reliability.
1.2 Fault Diagnosis
A fault in a system can be defined as a deviation from the expected working of the system
which can be due to a defect of some components of the circuit. They can be temporary or
permanent. Permanent faults are called as Solid or Hard faults and can result due to the wear-
ing out or breaking of components. Temporary faults can be referred to as soft faults and these
faults can be classified as intermiitent or transient as it occurs only at certain intervals of time.
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An intermittent fault occurs when the component is developing a permanent fault. A transient
fault can result due to some external disturbance like power supply fluctuations. Depending
upon the effect of faults, they can be classified as parametric or logical. A parametric fault
causes a change in speed, voltage or current as it alters the circuit parameter magnitude, while
a logical fault ends up changing the Boolean function originally realized by the circuit. Delay
fault which results due to slow gates is an important parametric fault and it leads to problems
of critical races or Hazards. Fault extent can be local or distributed. A distributed fault af-
fects multiple variables, whereas a local fault affects single variable. The clock malfunction
is an example of a distributed fault while a logical fault is an example of a local fault. With
the VLSI technology developing, the number of components on a single chip are increasing
drastically thus also increasing the probability of fault occurrence. Thus, this is an important
research area.
1.2.1 Faults and Degrdation
Depending on the behavior of the system, logical faults represent the behavior of the system
modeled. Logical faults has three important classes:
A) Stuck-at-faults: A single stuck-at-fault happens when either one of the inputs or the
output of the logic gate is fixed at either a logic 1 (stuck-at-1) or a logic 0 (stuck-at-0). They
can be denoted by abbreviations as s-a-1 and s-a-0 respectively. This fault model is a good
representation for types of defects such as open circuits and short circuits. The stuck-at model
can also represent multiple faults which results when multiple signal lines are stuck at logic 0
or logic 1.
B) Bridging faults: Bridging faults occur when two or more than two signal lines are
accidentally connected together. They can be classified as:
i) Input Bridging: This bridging fault results when a definite number of primary input lines
are shorted.
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ii) Feedback Bridging: This happens when there exists a short between an input and an
output line. This fault causes the circuit to either oscillate or convert to a sequential circuit.
It may occur between two or more signal lines or between the terminals of the transistor. In
CMOS circuits, depending upon the bridging resistance and the physical location, faults end
up manifesting as either stuck-open or stuck-at faults.
iii) Non-feedback Bridging: This category includes all the other remaining types of exist-
ing bridging faults apart from the above two types. If two lines happen to be physically close
to each other, the probability of them getting bridged is higher. In a positive logic, bridging
fault is assumed to behave as wired-AND with the dominant logic value being 0. In a negative
logic, bridging fault is assumed to behave as wired-OR with the dominant value being 1.
C) Delay Faults: Due to the occurrences of the statistical variations in the manufacturing
processes, the probability of appearance of smaller defects which causes partial short or open
in a circuit, increases. Due to these defects, the circuit fails in meeting the timing specifications
without altering the logic function of the circuit. The transition of the signal might get delayed
from 1 to 0, or vice versa due to a small defect. This is called as delay fault. They are of two
types:
i) Gate Delay Fault: It helps in modeling defects which causes the propagation delay of the
faulty gate to exceed the worst case value specified. It can be used to model isolated defects
but not distributed defects.
ii) Path Delay Fault: It can be used to model both isolated and distributed defects. This
fault occurs when the propagation delay exceeds its specified limit along a circuit path.
D) Transition and Intermittent Faults: These can be classified as Temporary faults. Ma-
jority of the malfunctioning in the digital circuits results due to the temporary faults and these
are also difficult to detect and isolate. Transient faults are the non-recurring temporary faults
which occurs due to the fluctuations of the power supply or the circuit exposure to some exter-
nal radiation like α-particle radiation. As there is no physical damage to the hardware, these
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faults cannot be repaired and thus are major souce of failures. Intermittent faults results due
to poor designs, loose connections, or due to components which are partially defective. They
happen due to the deteriorating or aging of the components, external environmental conditions
like vibration, humidity, temperature etc. Intermittent faults is based on the protection of the
system from the physical environment through cooling, filtering, shielding etc.
In digital systems, errors can happen through variouis causes including alpha particles
from package decay, cosmic rays creating energetic neutrons and protons, and thermal neu-
trons. In advanced process technologies, errors can occur due to device shrinking, reduced
power supply voltages, and higher operating frequencies which increase the probability of
transient errors which can significantly affect reliability of computations. In addition, single
event upsets and single event transients are generated due to cosmic rays which create ener-
getic protons and neutrons, thermal neutrons, random noise, or signal integrity problems all
resulting in device errors.
Degrdation in digital circuits can happen in many ways such as:
• Time-Dependent Dielectric Breakdown causes the leakage current affecting the transis-
tor gates to increase, it results in short circuit.
• The phenomenon of Electromigration causes the metal ions to migrate thus leading to
voids and holes in interconnect. These can cause open or short circuits which can cause
faults.
• The Hot-carrier effect (HCE) can cause the threshold voltage in CMOS transistors to
increase and also results in the degradtion of electron mobility.
1.2.2 Fault Detection Techniques
The process of determining whether the circuit contains a fault or not is called as fault detec-
tion [29]. As it is important to counteract such natural faults in order to achieve fault immunity
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and reliability, error detection has been an important part of a number of hardware architec-
tures in different domains, including various arithmetic unit sub-components [30]. In previous
work, reliable architectures have been devised to counteract natural or malicious faults [31],
e.g., cryptographic architectures immune to faults through concurrent error detection [12].
The different fault detection strategies can be classified as follows:
A) Concurrent Error Detection: It helps in detecting the faults in the circuit concurrently
with the normal operation of the circuit by making use of additional logic. It results in an error
if the resulting output is found different than the predicted output by the checker unit [32].The
error coverage can be improved greatly using the methods of duplication or including parity
check registers in the circuit. For improving the error coverage, the trade-off with area or
latency, or throughput can be made. The errors can be also detected by running the circuit
twice, once with the original operands and the second time using encoded operands such that
different outputs are obtained. The checker will raise the error indication flaf incase of a
mismatch between the two ouputs. The operands can be encoded using different methods like
Recomputing with Shifted Operands (RESO), Recomputing with Rotated Operands(RERO),
also by a slight modification of the RESO model [33].
B) Off-Line Fault Detection: This method helps in identifying faults in FPGAs and
ASICs when they are not in operation with the use of additional circuitry. It helps in detect-
ing manufacturing defects. Automated-Test-Pattern-Generator (ATPG) and Built-in-Self-Test
(BIST) are some examples of off-line test circuits. The fault detection process does not in-
volve the original circuitry. It connects the device under test between a pattern generator and
an output response analyzer. In order to obtain full error coverage, it is important to check
the logic and interconnects and the configuration network. For the FPGAs [34], the need of
a large number of test configurations has been eliminated as the additional testing circuitry is
built into the development boards by most of the recent consumer grade FPGAs [35]. BIST
does not interfere with the normal FPGA operation, and also covers clock networks and PLLs
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which are complicated systems.
C) Roving Fault Detection: This method helps in pointing out the faulty location in the
FPGA circuit. It checks for defects in the FPGA by scanning it entirely and replaces those
defects with a test function. It basically helps in adapting the BIST techniques with minimum
increase in the area. In the roving detection, the entire FPGA is split equally into a number
of regions where one region carries out the BIST testing while the others undergo normal
operations. The speed of the roving method depends on the speed of the roving cycle as well
as on the operation time. It has been reported that the latency of the best roving methods is
less than one second.
1.3 Objectives
In this thesis, motivated by the lightweight constructions of Simon and Speck, we propose
CED schemes which have acceptable area and power overheads instead of being a burden for
such constructions. To the best of our knowledge, research on developing reliable architectures
for Simon and Speck have not been reported to date.
Our contributions in this thesis are summarized as follows::
• We use time redundancy concurrent error detection techniques and propose reliable
hardware architectures for both Simon and Speck block ciphers. These schemes add
acceptable overhead to the original designs, maintaining the lightweight property of the
crypto-architectures.
• The proposed architectures are benchmarked for the ability to detect transient and per-
manent faults by performing fault injection simulations. The results of our error sim-
ulations show high error coverage for both of these block ciphers. The proposed fault
detection schemes give error coverage of 100% and 99.98% for Simon and Speck, re-
spectively, for a multi-bit random fault injection.
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• Finally, we implement the architectures on FPGA platform (two FPGA families from
Xilinx, i.e., Virtex-7 and Zynq-7000) to compare the performance and implementation
metrics with the original Simon and Speck designs. The results show that the proposed
designs have acceptable overheads with very high error coverage. The area, delay, and
throughput overheads are acceptable for these two ciphers. For instance, for Speck
and Virtex-7, the power overhead is negligible, and the area, delay, and throughput
overheads are 11%, 3%, and 3%, respectively.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The structure of the thesis is as follows:
• CHAPTER 2: This chapter provides the preliminary information for the understanding
of basic SIMON and SPECK operation.
• CHAPTER 3: This chapter is used as a motivating section to give details regarding
various CED techniques and their shortfalls. Moreover, it presents the proposed design
for reliable architectures..
• CHAPTER 4: In this chapter, the fault injection simulations are performed to determine
the error detection capabilities of the proposed architectures. The proposed designs are
implemented on FPGA and benchmarked.




This chapter presents a brief description of Simon and Speck in following.
2.1 Simon
The Simon family has block ciphers for ten distinct block and key sizes which are generally
written as Simon 2n/mn for a 2n-bit block and m-word (mn-bit) key. For example, if the block
size is 48 bits, then, n = 24. If the word size is m = 4, then, key is m : n = 4 : 24 = 96 bits,
i.e., mn bits. The different sizes make the algorithm useful for a wide variety of constrained
devices with different levels of security.
The round function is repeated to obtain a cipher-text and is a Feistel Map having two
stages (see Fig. 2.1) as follows: Rk(x;y) = (y⊕ f (x)⊕k;x), where f (x) = (Sx : S8x)S2x , and k is
the round key given by the key schedule. In this process, ⊕denotes XOR, and for a given j, S j
is left circular shift (the non-linearity is achieved here by rotating the same input by different
number of bits and then performing their AND operation).
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Figure 2.2: SPECK block diagram
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2.2 Speck
The Speck family is represented, similar to Simon, as Speck 2n/mn. The round function, as
shown in Fig. 2.2, is Rk(x,y) = ((S−αx + y)⊕k,S
β
y ⊕(S−αx + y)⊕k). Here, if the block size is 32,
then, inputs are rotated by amounts α = 7 and β = 2 (similarly, α = 8 and β = 3 for others).
The non-linearity is obtained by using the modular addition which favors a software platform
over hardware.
There is always a bargain between efficiency and security depending upon the application
requirements. It is very difficult to achieve both at the same time. To obtain high level of
security, a very strong algorithm with large key is needed but this increases the hardware
overhead. Conversely, if efficiency is important, then we use a simple algorithm with a small
key and run large number of rounds. This would not have large hardware overhead but the
security obtained would not be very high. The Simon and Speck families with different key
sizes for different block sizes attempt to give fairly good security, keeping hardware overhead
to a low amount, nonetheless, giving good efficiency.
Chapter 3
Proposed Reliable Architectures for
Simon and Speck
We present the motivation behind our work in this chapter and discuss shortfalls and problems
encountered by different CED techniques. Then, we present our proposed CED technique for
Simon and Speck.
3.1 Motivations
As motivations to our proposed work, we briefly present different CED techniques, and some
possible shortcomings with respect to lightweight applications. Full hardware redundancy
techniques give good fault detection architectures; however, this is at the cost of large hardware
resources. Therefore, such schemes cannot be used for lightweight algorithms.
3.1.1 Signature-based Diagnosis Approach
The registers in the datapath are key elements to propagate the errors. Hence, it is imperative
that we detect presence of faults in the datapath registers. Signatures, e.g., interleaved or





















Figure 3.1: Proposed signature-based CED scheme for Simon.
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Figure 3.3: Adopted self-checking adder used for modular addition of Speck.
As a case study, parity-based CED scheme for Simon and Speck has been described in Fig.
3.1 and Fig. 3.2. The general approach is to calculate value for the parity bit based on the
individual bits held by the register and then compare it by taking an XOR with the predicted
parity bit value, then, any discrepancies witnessed raises the error indication flags.
The main disadvantage of the parity scheme is that the error coverage is almost only 50%.
This is due to the fact that only odd number of faults can get detected with this method.
The Speck algorithm employs a modular adder in one of the steps to arbitrate the plaintext.
To perform this addition, Fig. 3.3 shows a four-bit self checking adder. It uses two four-bit
full adders to calculate addition results with input carry ‘0’ and ‘1’. Then, according to actual
input carry, the final output carry bit is selected. The self-checking action is performed by the
two-pair two-rail checker as explained in [36]. However, as Speck and Simon are lightweight




























Figure 3.4: Applicable robust protection scheme for Simon.
error detection in our architecture.
3.1.2 Robust Protection Scheme
In [21], the authors have proposed a robust protection scheme against DFA attacks. It is based
on using non-linear robust error detecting codes with input as well as the computed output.
The proposed design employs a counter to count the number of faults encountered by the
device in its life-time, and once it reaches a pre-decided threshold value, the secret key is
cleared by the device since it is assumed that, typically, it encounters lower number of natural
faults than those required by a practical DFA.
In this scheme, non-linear codes are obtained using a cubic function. As shown in Fig.
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Figure 3.5: Robust error detection scheme for Speck.
3.4 and Fig. 3.5, applying such methods to Simon and Speck can be considered, i.e., two
cubic functions are used at the input and output of each round function. The cubic function
selection is based on the fact that it gives best error coverage without requiring complicated
hardware. A square function does not give a good error coverage, and the functions having
powers higher than three result in much complicated hardware. Thus, the cubic function is a
trade-off between error coverage and complexity.
In these figures, the linear predictor generates a signature which is equivalent to the component-
wise XOR of the output bytes of a round based on the block size. This signature is then passed
on to the cubic function. In cases where the size of the cubic function is less than that of
linear predictor, a compressor is used to compress the size of the predictor output so that it
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matches the size of the cubic function input. The cubic function with signature r is dependent
on primitive polynomial. For a 24-bit input, the signature of the cubic function can be cho-
sen to be less than or greater than 24. The compressor is needed if r is greater than 24. In
order to reduce the complexity by not using the compressor, the primitive polynomial can be,
for instance, x20+x17+1 or x16+x5+x3+x2+1 for r = 20 or 16, respectively. The compressor
shown in the design is to illustrate a generalized architecture incorporating all components of
a robust scheme. This scheme provides protection for the encryptor and decryptor, as well as
the key generation algorithm.
This method gives 100% error coverage; however, the hardware overhead is almost 50%
which may not be acceptable considering the lightweight applications of Simon and Speck.
Thus, this scheme may not be ideal to be used for protection of Simon and Speck.
3.2 Proposed Error Detection Schemes
So far, we have explained problems with usage of various fault diagnosis schemes, such as
higher overheads in case of hardware redundancy and robust codes or lower error detection
rate in case of parity schemes. Therefore, we select a protection scheme that will provide
close to 100% error coverage at suitable area and power overheads. The proposed scheme,
as explained in the following, have high error detection rate at acceptable performance metric
overheads.
Here, we propose concurrent error detection schemes which are applicable to both Simon
and Speck.
In addition to the schemes used in this thesis, the RESO approach can also be used for
error detection. In RESO-k, in the re-computation step, the inputs are shifted left by k bits.
Now, usually the leftmost k bits, on shifting, will get lost. If we are to store them, we will need
to house an n+ k bit register. This will, in turn, create needs for all the subsequent registers
and computations to be of n+ k bit length, i.e., the adders and data-path registers will be of




























Figure 3.6: Proposed error detection approach for Simon.
n+ k bits. Due to this, the re-computation step will take more cycles to produce the output.
This latency will only increase with higher values of k. To house the increased size, more chip
area will be consumed, resulting in increased complexity. Due to these drawbacks, we do not
propose RESO as a comparatively good error detection approach.
For the sake of brevity, we shall discuss only the error detection of the encryption opera-
tion. We note that the decryption can be protected through the proposed approaches as well.
We propose RERO for both Simon and Speck. Based on the methods of processing the
data, we propose two types of architectures, i.e., iterative and pipelined architectures. A Si-
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mon block cipher having a 2n-bit block of plain-text made up of two n-bit words Xi+1 and Xi
is passed as input as shown in Fig. 3.6. Each of the input blocks (plaintext blocks) is operated
upon twice. A multiplexer controls the passage of the normal and recomputed plaintext. Dur-
ing the first run, the operands are passed in their normal state. As can be seen in this figure,
the Feistel stepping of Simon round function operates on the plaintext. The output generated
is stored in a register for a later comparison. During the second run, the multiplexer selects
the re-computed operand to be passed on to Simon. The recomputed plaintext is obtained by
rotating the input by a constant value of a bits. Each word of the input blockcipher is rotated
by same amount of a bits towards right or left. Similarly, the key Ki is also recomputed by
rotating it by same amount in same direction as the plaintext. The Feistel stepping function’s
output is the recomputed output. This output is then rotated in inverse direction by a bits. The
output thus obtained is compared with the output calculated originally in the first run. These
two are then XOR-ed to check their equality and the error indication flag is raised if they are
not equal.
Let us take the example of Simon48/96. Each of the 24-bit words of the input is trans-
formed to [Xi+123 .. Xi+1 j+1 Xi+1 j .. Xi+10] and [Xi23 .. Xi j+1 Xi j .. Xi0]. During
the second run, we rotate left by j bits ( j is an integer such that j = 0 to23) which makes
the input as [Xi+ 1 j .. Xi+ 10 Xi+ 123 .. Xi+ 1 j+1] and [Xi j .. Xi0 Xi23 .. Xi j+1]. The
outputs, Xi+2 and Xi+1, are then fed back as inputs to the next round of the function. Thus,
we iterate the input through the round function repeatedly to get a final secure ciphertext. A
multiplexer selects between the main plaintext and the ciphertext generated by previous round.
Each cipher family is iterated through a pre-decided number of times [7]. Simon48/96 is run
through the round function 36 times to get the final output.
For the Speck algorithm, as shown in Fig. 3.7, a similar methodology is followed where
we compare recomputed and original outputs. Inequalities will raise the error indication flags.
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Figure 3.7: Proposed error detection approach for the Speck algorithm.
An important component in Speck is the modular adder. We use the self checking adder in
Fig. 3.8 and modify it to make it work on rotated operands for Speck48/96.
Consider Fig. 3.8 which shows the proposed modified self checking adder. The main
reason behind modifying the normal self-checking adder is to assure that the carry generated
by addition of b23 and a23 does not affect the z0 bit after rotation and after rotation, correct
carry goes into addition of bits b j+1 and a j+1.
During the first run, the input operands are appended with bit-@ (a stuck-at-0 bit) at the
most-significant bit position of both the operands. Therefore, an (n+ 1)-bit adder is needed
to operate upon these operands. The effect of this bit-@ is such that no matter what carry
out actually gets generated by the bit-(n− 1), the bit-@ will always be ‘0’. Now, during the
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Figure 3.8: Modular adder operation for the Speck algorithm in the proposed scheme.
second run, after rotating the input, we ensure that the adder operands have bit-@ between
bit-0 and bit-23. The addition of the bits-23 (b23 and a23) will generate a carry-out which does
not affect the bits-0 (b0 and a0) addition result due to the presence of bit-@ between them.
This enables correct addition result before and after the rotation. Moreover, as can be seen in
the figure, the carry-out generated by the last bits is connected as carry-in to the first bits. This
is again to ensure correct addition of the bits j+1 and j during both runs. At the output z, the
bit-@ is removed from the result, i.e., for first run, let p be the output [@b23 . . . b j+1 b j . . . b0]
+ [@a23 . . . a j+1 a j . . . a0] =[p23 . . . p j+1 p j . . . p0] and for the second run, let q be the output
[b j . . . b0 @ b23 . . . b j+1] + [a j . . . a0 @ a23 . . . a j+1] =[q23 . . . q j+1 q j . . . q0].
In this iterative approach, we let the entire input pass through the hardware before passing
the next input. This reduces the throughput since hardware is not being used at its fullest
and it takes more number of cycles to run the input through single round. We, alternatively,
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propose a pipeline architecture to improve such throughput degradations. Sub-pipelining can
be performed to alleviate this problem. Suppose n pipeline-registers have been placed to
sub-pipeline the structures to break the timing path to approximately equal segments. Let
us denote the segments of pipelined stages by ∃n. The original input is first applied to the
architecture and in the second cycle, while the second segment of the circuit executes the
first input, the second input or the encoded variant of the first input is fed to the first half
of the circuit (this depends on the objectives, i.e., reliability vs. getting the results first). This
trend is consecutively executed for normal and rotated operands. Such approach ensures lower
degradation in the throughput (and achieving higher frequencies) at the expense of more area
overhead.
Chapter 4
Error Injection Simulations and
Implementations through FPGA
In what follows, we present the results of our error simulations and FPGA implementations
benchmark.
4.1 Error Simulations
The proposed fault detection architectures have been simulated after injecting faults. The
proposed architectures have the capability of detecting both permanent and transient faults
(this covers both natural and malicious faults). The approach that has been followed for the
proposed fault diagnosis schemes is to inject faults and then observe the error indication flags.
For simulations, Verilog HDL has been used. We have considered all the sub-blocks of the
original architecture, i.e., the adders, XOR, AND, and OR gates, to induce faults by flipping
one or more bits and then inspect the generated outputs. We have considered a particular fault
scenario and applied different inputs to assert a sub-set of entries while injecting faults. We,
then, observe all the errors that get detected for all the inputs. The fault model used to test
the proposed architectures is created using external feedback Linear Feedback Shift Registers
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(LFSR) to generate pseudo-random fault vectors that can flip random bits in the output of the
gates and at random intervals. The LFSRs used here are 8-bit registers with the polynomial
x8+1 for maximum taps. This is achieved using multiplexers whose select signal is driven
using an LFSR, thus, randomizing the selection of faulty bit (coming from another LFSR) and
correct bit, i.e., the actual results.
As discussed in the previous chapters, for the RERO scheme, we pass normal input in the
first round and then pass the rotated one in the second round. Thus, each of Simon and Speck
requires two runs to detect presence of faults. The Simon block cipher has a combination of
AND and XOR gates. We select random 4 bits from each of these gates and inject faults in
them. The Speck block cipher, has two modular adders in its architecture as well. Similar
approach is followed to induce faults here, i.e., we select any 4 bits from each of the adders
and the gates and flip them using the LFSRs. Thus, a total of 12 different faults are induced
in each Simon and Speck. In addition to this multiple random fault model and to assess other
potential scenarios, we also test our architecture for 2/3/4-bit fault models. Overall 100,000
faults are injected in each cipher and the error indication flag is observed. A counter is set
to count the number of faults detected. It is observed that for Simon we get very close to
100% error coverage, and for Speck, we get 99.98% error coverage, i.e., 99,980 faults are
detected (for the sake of brevity, the tables for such faults are not added). This is inline with
the expected results. Thus, our proposed architectures give very high fault coverage.
Next, we describe the results obtained after implementing our proposed architectures on
Virtex-7 and Zynq-7000 Xilinx FPGA families [36].
4.2 Implementations on FPGAs
This part presents the overhead incurred while applying the proposed error detection schemes
on FPGA platforms. We would like to emphasize that the presented results are independent
of the platform or FPGA family, and similar results are expected on other hardware platforms.
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The implementations on FPGAs have been performed on Xilinx Virtex-7 and Zynq-7000 fam-
ilies using Xilinx Vivado 2014.4 Design Suite. The devices used are xc7k70tfbg484-1Q and
xc7v585tffg1157-3 from Zynq-7000 and Viretx-7 families, respectively. In order to get the
overheads, we compare the implementation results obtained from the original Simon and
Speck architecture with those from with the proposed error detection architectures.
The implementations have been performed for Simon48/96 and Speck48/96 block ciphers.
The Simon cipher has to make 36 runs to give a final cipher text. Similarly, for Speck, it has
to be run 23 times. According to the RERO approach, during each run, the input needs to be
passed for two rounds in order to detect an error. This degrades the overall throughput of the
device as can be seen in all the tables below. Nevertheless, we can alleviate this as discussed
before using sub-pipelining.
Each of the two ciphers has a control unit that directs the passage of normal/rotated
operands to the main block cipher module. The control unit then receives the normal/recomputed
outputs at the end of each round and sets/resets the error indication flags.
The overhead calculations are made for three parameters, i.e., area overhead in terms of
number of LUTs, delay (in terms of ns), and power consumption (in terms of mW ), shown in
Tables 4.1 to 4.4.
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 outlay implementation results for Simon block cipher using Zynq-
7000 and Virtex-7 families, respectively. The results are in conformity with our expectations
for lightweight applications. As can be seen, the power and delay overheads for both devices
are acceptable. The original Simon architecture being made up of combinational logic, has
a small slice area occupancy. The XOR and OR gates, responsible for the setting of error
indication flag, occupy considerable LUTs and hence the area overhead goes to roughly 30%.
This can be seen as a trade-off for this scheme but considering that other viable error detection
schemes consume more area, we can consider that this is an acceptable area overhead that is
always incurred if the Simon block cipher is to be given close to 100% error coverage.
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Table 4.1: Zynq-7000 FPGA implementation results for Simon block cipher
Metric Simon Simon-RERO Overhead
Power (mW) 239 ∼239 Negligible
Delay (ns) 5.448 5.607 2.919%
Area (LUT) 73 95 30.137%
Throughput (Gbps) 0.245 (0.238)1 (2.836%)
1. One stage sub-pipelined.
Table 4.2: Virtex-7 FPGA implementation results for Simon block cipher
Metric Simon Simon-RERO Overhead
Power (mW) 248 ∼248 Negligible
Delay (ns) 4.415 4.562 3.330%
Area (LUT) 73 95 30.137%
Throughput (Gbps) 0.302 (0.292)1 (3.4%)
1. One stage sub-pipelined.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 provide the results for the Speck cipher implemented on Zynq-7000 and
Virtex-7. It can be seen that for Speck, the metrics have low to acceptable overheads. Thus, our
proposed error detection schemes give almost 100% error coverage at acceptable power, area,
and delay overheads and, hence, can be used for the error detection of constrained lightweight
Speck block cipher. The above proposed architectures are independent of the platforms con-
sidered. Even-though the implementations were performed only on select FPGA families, we
expect similar results on other FPGA families and also on other hardware platforms.
4.3 Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) 29
Table 4.3: Xilinx Zynq-7000 FPGA implementation for Speck block cipher
Metric Speck Speck-RERO Overhead
Power (mW) 234 ∼234 Negligible
Delay (ns) 5.552 5.904 6.340%
Area (LUT) 199 221 11.055%
Throughput (Gbps) 0.376 (0.353)1 (5.962%)
1. One stage sub-pipelined.
Table 4.4: Xilinx Virtex-7 FPGA implementation for Speck block cipher
Metric Speck Speck-RERO Overhead
Power (mW) 245 ∼245 Negligible
Delay (ns) 4.183 4.333 3.585%
Area (LUT) 199 221 11.055%
Throughput (Gbps) 0.499 (0.481)1 (3.6%)
1. One stage sub-pipelined.
4.3 Differential Fault Analysis (DFA)
The proposed methods, being for reliability, can deal with permanent and transient faults.
Even though the proposed methods make a potential DFA attack more difficult to mount but
they may not completely thwart such attacks. Here, we present previous DFA attacks on
Simon and Speck families and make additional modifications to our proposed architecture so
as to go towards making such attacks more difficult.
The work in [37–39] presents three DFA attacks on Simon family. The authors used data
leaked by AND operation to deduce the secret key. In case of Speck, the authors in [37]
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describe that the modular addition can be used by the attackers to gain knowledge of the
secret key. After analyzing the block cipher, they concluded that injecting fault in each round
will not help them get the secret key. In [37] and [38], the authors have demonstrated that by
injecting a bit-flip fault at the input of penultimate round (or ante penultimate round in case
of [39]), they can deduce the value of at most two bits of the penultimate input. Thus, in turn,
they can find out the value of the secret key used in the last round. The main difference in the
three papers is the number of fault injections required to get all the bits of the secret key.
This DFA attack can potentially bypass the proposed RERO error detection scheme (please
also refer to [40]). Therefore, we make a small architectural addition to our proposed scheme
in order to detect such type of DFA attacks. Since the fault injections are made at the input
of a round, we compare the input sub-cipher in each round (starting from second round) with
that generated in previous round. Any discrepancies will be indicated by the error indication
flag. Should the attacker try to inject faults in the sub-cipher in the previous round itself,
the previously proposed RERO scheme will detect such an attack. Thus, the RERO and the
suggested addition should be able to protect Simon and Speck against permanent and transient
faults and make the DFA attacks presented in [37–39] more difficult; however, we do not claim
that it will be able to detect all types of DFA attacks.
The signature-based diagnosis approach, which uses linear codes that can (always) detect
random errors of small multiplicity (and can never detect some other errors); is diverse from
an architecture based on robust codes which can detect (with probability) any error. These
two solutions have two different goals, the first gives reliability and the second gives hardware
security (against DFA).
Finally, It is noted that according to [41], the linear compressor can make the code not
robust anymore. Furthermore, this compressor is not required at all since cubic function can
be designed for any vector length. In the context of its hardware overhead, there are high rate
robust codes [42] that have lower hardware complexity [43].
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4.4 Comparison with Previous Work
There has not been any prior work done on error detection methods for these ciphers to the best
of our knowledge. In [44], the authors present fault diagnosis of Pomaranch cipher. They have
used bit-interleaved scheme for error detection. We compare the overheads of Pomaranch with
the proposed scheme. The area and throughput overheads for Pomaranch are 21% and 12%,
respectively. The proposed schemes have area and throughput overheads of 30% and 10%
for Simon and 11% and 6% for Speck, respectively. Since the architecture of Pomaranch and
presented fault detection scheme is a lot different than the proposed method, the differences in
the overheads are reasonably justified. The proposed fault detection methods can be applied
to Pomaranch and other ciphers as well to obtain approximately closer overheads.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Our research group has extensive experience in cryptographic engineering and fault diagno-
sis as well as editing IEEE Transactions journals [45–91]. This thesis proposes reliable and
efficient error detection architectures for the block ciphers Simon and Speck. The proposed
schemes are optimized for low-area and low-power applications since Simon and Speck are
among lightweight block ciphers. We propose diagnosis approaches for inner sub-blocks of
these ciphers and present an approach for alleviating the throughput overheads. The simulation
results show that the proposed error detection schemes can detect close to 100% of the injected
faults. We have also implemented our proposed architectures on two Xilinx FPGA families,
i.e., Zynq-7000 and Virtex-7 families. The implementation results show that the power, area,
and delay overheads incurred by the proposed architectures are acceptable. Therefore, the
proposed architectures for Simon and Speck block ciphers can be reliably and efficiently used
and further tailored by customizing the architectures based upon the requirements in terms of
reliability, security, and overhead tolerance.
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5.1 Future Works
The proposed work provides fault detection in the inner sub-blocks of the cipher and can
protect against suprious faults. The main objective of the proposed work is towards achieving
a low-area and low-power consuming architecture along with 100% fault detection.
The fault detection scheme used in this proposal was RERO. However, previous works
have been performed on other lightweight block ciphers like CLEFIA and PRESENT using
different fault detection schemes. These methods can also be used to test SIMON and SPECK
and the performance metrics can be obsereved.
An important parameter while implementing a design is the type of platform used which
determines the hardware fabric that will be utilized for implementation. The proposed work
was implemented on Xilinx Zynq and Virtex FPGA families. However, the proposed design
can be implemented on other FPGA devices and the results can be benchmarked. Similarly,
compared to an FPGA, implementations on ASIC platforms might be more suitable in terms
of area and power optimizations for some applications. Therefore, ASIC implementation can
be the next part of the proposed work.
The proposed work has been proved to be resilient against natural faults. It has been also
shown that a number of fault attacks can be thwarted based on the error models used in this
thesis. This architecture can be further modified to provide better protection against such
attacks. Thus, in the future, a complete solution against all types of attacks can be devised to
devise an immune block cipher.
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